





Tomlinson, J., Phillips, J.  and Wright, V.  (2019) De-industrialization: a case study of 
Dundee, 1951-2001, and its broad implications. Business History. (Early Online 
Publication) 
(doi: 10.1080/00076791.2019.1676235) 
This is the Author Accepted Manuscript. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/198886/   
 








































Jim Tomlinson, Jim Phillips, and Valerie Wright 
 












Using a case study of one Scottish city, Dundee, this paper addresses some of the tensions 
involved in the use of the concept of ‘de-industrialization’. Widely used to try and understand 
economic and social change in the post-war years, this term is complex and controversial. 
This paper unravels some of this complexity, arguing that the term is potentially very helpful, 
but needs careful definition, nuanced application and recognition of its limits. The focus here 
is on the impact of changing industrial structures on the labour market. After analysing the 
processes of firm births and deaths, the paper looks at the decline of the ‘old staple’ industry, 
jute manufacturing in Dundee. The next sections assess the role of multinational enterprises 
in re-shaping the employment structure of the city, before looking at the contraction of some 
of the city’s other industries. Attention then turns to the impact of all these changes on the 
economic welfare of the city. The final section draws conclusions about our general 
understanding of de-industrialization from the Dundee case. 
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De-industrialization is a term increasingly deployed in attempts to understand economic and 
social change in the advanced economies in the post-war years. A variety of approaches to 
this phenomenon are evident in the literature, ranging from political economy to cultural 
history.1 This paper uses a broadly defined political economy approach to the de-
industrialization of one city, Dundee, to address some of the complexities and tensions 
involved in the use of the term, and to challenge some of the interpretations commonly put 
upon it. It starts from the basis that the term is indeed very helpful, but needs careful 
definition, nuanced application and recognition of its limits if it is to be employed to best 
enhance our understanding.2  In particular, its productive use requires close attention not only 
to changes in industrial sectors, but also those at the level of the individual firm.   
 
Concern with de-industrialization in public discourse materialized in Britain in the 1970s. At 
that time it was mainly perceived as linked to macroeconomic issues, especially the balance 
of payments and national economic growth.3 This debate drew on two distinct strands of 
older economics literature, which either saw manufacturing as the key to high overall growth 
rates, or worried about the long-run productivity consequences of the rise of services.4 The 
debates of the 1970s and subsequent decades that focussed on these macroeconomic matters 
were by no means all based on the belief that de-industrialization was a problem, with both 
journalists and academics arguing (from differing perspectives) that its dangers were, at a 
minimum, being exaggerated. 5 
 
But while this macroeconomic concern has periodically re-surfaced in public debate, since 
the 1980s most of the de-industrialization literature has focussed on the labour market impact, 
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and very much emphasized the negative effects of the process on industrial workers and the 
communities in which they lived.6 The emergence of such a literature in the 1980s, notably in 
North America and Britain, was in the context of the industrial contractions experienced in 
those countries at that time, and the major increases in unemployment that followed. In turn, 
a feature of this literature was the linking of those contractions to ‘declinist’ tropes, which 
saw them, not as some passing cyclical or contingent event, but evidence of a deep-seated 
pathology of the national economy.7  
 
The ‘declinist’ approach to twentieth-century economic and industrial change is deeply 
embedded in Scotland, and the history of the country as an ‘Industrial Nation’. That history 
is, in the words of Morton and Griffiths, ‘a largely familiar one of a prolonged retreat from 
the heights of heavy industrial success and the problems encountered by an economy in 
which, for much of the period, average income lagged behind those for Britain as a whole…’. 
8 The declinist narrative generally centres on a story of  historic ‘over-commitment’ to the old 
staples (coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding, textiles), the attempts to ‘modernize’ this structure 
towards lighter, consumer-oriented, sectors after 1945, but with an emphasis on the limited 
and transient nature of the success of such endeavours. Knox and McKinlay’s 
characterisation is typical: ‘Scotland, where a narrowly integrated industrial structure based 
on shipbuilding, engineering, coal, and iron and steel inhibited the emergence of new 
industries for most of the twentieth century.’ 9  
 
Transience is usually seen as the result of an over reliance on inward investment by 
multinational companies. So the economic history literature of the late twentieth-century 
tended to see the structural change that occurred as failing to correct the long run problems of 
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the Scottish economy, though the culprits for this continuing ‘decline’ varied according to 
ideological taste.10  
 
Unsurprisingly, given the hugely damaging effects of industrial contraction on many parts of 
Scotland from the 1970s onwards, the story of de-industrialization of that country has become 
both part of a declinist national narrative, and focussed attention on the immediate economic 
and social harms inflicted by that process. 11 This approach has gone along with a tendency 
for accounts of de-industrialization in Scotland (and, indeed, elsewhere) to focus on industrial 
closures.12  Again, while the concern with closure is fully explicable given the political 
charge of such events, this focus misleads as to the underlying processes at work in de-
industrialization. As noted by Dickson and Judge in the introduction to their book on closures 
in the 1980s: ‘Admittedly, the experience of closure is not new, and has been a recurrent 
feature of capitalist development…What is new is that whereas in the past old plants closed 
to be replaced by new factories, production methods and new jobs, in the 1980s closure and 
job loss are no longer counteracted by plant openings and job gains’.13 
 
The focus on closure within accounts of de-industrialization has tended to be accompanied by 
a concern with resistance to such closures.14 Of course, such episodes of resistance are 
important to our understanding of the recent political and social history of Scotland, 
particularly where these involved workers articulating a sense of ownership of factories in 
moral economy terms.15 On the other hand, in studying the longer-run process of de-
industrialization we need to be clear that, just as closures are not the main mechanism of 
decline in industrial employment, organized resistance to such closure is highly atypical of 




Focussing upon the dynamics of sectoral and firm-level changes, this article contributes to 
understanding of de-industrialization by emphasizing that it was a complex and long-running 
process rather than a chronologically-compressed sequence of inherently contentious events. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section one discusses the ‘demographics’ of de-
industrialization, and some of the data problems which arise from seeking to understand this 
process. Section two looks at the decline of ‘juteopolis’, while section three analyses the role 
of multinational enterprises and their significance for the structural changes of the period. 
Section four looks briefly at some other industries in Dundee. Section five summarizes the 
consequences of de-industrialization for Dundee. The final section draws general conclusions 
about our understanding of de-industrialization from the Dundee case. 
 
     I 
 
De-industrialization is defined here as a trend reduction in the share of industrial in total 
employment, and such a trend is the effect of a number of components.  First, of course, such 
a trend is compatible with some industrial sectors expanding, as the designation ‘industrial’ 
covers a set of heterogenous components, which may have quite different trajectories. In 
most literature ‘industrial’ covers mining, manufacturing, and construction. In the case of 
Dundee, the first of these is not relevant, and construction has experienced sharp cycles but 
no long-term trend in the numbers employed.17  So in Dundee manufacturing has always 
quantitatively been the great bulk of ‘industry’, and where changes have been concentrated, 
as Table 1 makes clear. (There are problems with variation in the precise definition of sectors 
at these different dates, but these are not sufficient to undermine the broad evidence of 
change).  This overall trajectory of that change, it can be noted, is broadly similar between 
Scotland as a whole and Dundee.18 (In this paper ‘Dundee’ is taken to mean the local 
6 
 
authority area, which was subject to a significant boundary change in 1996 when 
approximately 15,000 people were allocated to neighbouring areas. But the losses were 
overwhelmingly from residential suburbs, so the impact on figures for employment was 
limited. Between 1975 and 1996 Dundee was part of Tayside region, but data continued to be 




Table 1. Industrial distribution of employed population in Dundee, 1951, 1971, 2001 
 
 1951 (aged over 15)  1971 (aged over 15) 2001 (aged 16-74) 
Manufacturing  51.6* 42.0 15.2 
Construction 5.8** 7.8 6.7 
Utilities 1.3*** 1.4 0.9 
Transport, storage 
and communication 
7.4**** 5.2 6.1 
All ‘industry’ 66.1 56.4 28.9 
 
*Minimum List Headings 20-199       ** MLH200-202     *** MLH 210-212    ****MLH 
220-239 
 
Sources: 1951: calculated from Census 1951. Scotland vol. V. Occupations and Industries 
Table 13  ‘Dundee city’ ; 1971 calculated from Census 1971. Scotland Economic Activity (10 
per cent sample), Table 3 ‘Dundee city’;  2001: Census 2001. Scotland. Key Statistics for 





But if de-industrialization is deemed important because of its impact on the labour market, 
and especially in bringing the collapse of manual work for those with relatively poor formal 
educational qualifications, it follows that some occupations outside strictly-defined ‘industry’ 
need to be included in our discussion. There are no easy dividing lines here, but certainly jobs 
in transport (railways, docks and road transport) would seem obvious cases for treating as 
‘industrial’.   
 
Changes in the labour market are not just driven by sectoral change. Lots of change in the 
composition of work is driven by changing occupational patterns within industries, and there 
is good evidence that in the long-run such changes have been very significant. A pioneering 
Ministry of Labour study for the period 1951-61, looking at the UK as a whole, argued that 
‘whilst different rates of employment growth among industries have had an influence on the 
occupational pattern of the economy, a stronger influence was the fundamental change in the 
occupational structure of individual industries’.19 This study was an early recognition of the 
growth of administrative, clerical, and technical employment in all sectors of industry, and, 
conversely, the decline of manual work. For Scotland, sociologists have made a similar 
argument for the importance of within-industry occupational change, focussing upon the 
years 1981-2001. 20 
 
This paper focuses on sectoral change and the associated analytic framework of de-
industrialization, but it important to acknowledge that this framework is imperfect for 
capturing the shifts we are concerned with, and other aspects of occupational change need to 




In line with the terminology adopted by the ONS, the decline in industrial employment can be 
thought of in demographic terms—as a population whose size is the consequence of both 
births and deaths.21  ‘Births’ encompasses both new firms opening and expansion of existing 
plants; ‘deaths’ covers both closures and contractions. The balance of these elements may 
shift over time, though as general point it is important to note that even in periods of marked 
overall contraction lots of new jobs will be being created. Table 2 below shows the data for 
Dundee in the 1980s. This makes clear that closures, while very important, were only one 
component of the loss of manufacturing employment.  We lack comparable data for other 
periods, but it is possible that the contribution of closures to the overall pattern was especially 
high in the 1980s, given the huge impact of the economic contraction at the beginning of that 
decade, so Table 2 may overstate their significance in other periods.   
Table 2. Changes in manufacturing employment in Dundee 1981-1990 
Openings     + 
2,504 
 Closures  - 5,883  
Expansions    + 
4560 
 Contractions - 3,479  
Gross job 
gains 
  + 
7,064 
 Gross job 
losses 
- 9,362  
      
Net 
change 
   - 2,298  









   11-25 +265  
   26-50 -71  
   51-100 +32  
   101-200 +357  
   201-500 -981  
   501+      -4,296  
 





So in trying to understand de-industrialization, we need to understand, on one side both 
shrinkage and closure, and on the other, the entry of new firms and their expansion. This was 
clearly recognized in John MacInnes’s pioneering study of Glasgow, where he noted that the 
city’s ‘major problem is its low rate of job creation: less than half that of the New Towns and 
one which has declined in the course of the 1970s and 1980s’.22 In principle, job creation 
covers expansion of existing firms, the movement in of firms from elsewhere, and the 
creation of new firms. Sections II and III below look at the first two of these elements, but it 
is important to note how much emphasis both academic analysis and policy have put on 
facilitating the birth of firms.  
 
While specialists in industrial relations and industrial sociology have focussed on job loss, the 
substantial literature on ‘births’ has come mainly from economists.23 Policy encouragement 
of small firm creation has been important across the UK since the 1970s, despite a degree of 
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ideological contention that has been attached to these firms.24 Such encouragement was a 
central focus of the Scottish Development Agency, established in 1976, and an important part 
of its activities in Dundee, not least by building factories, or sub-dividing existing ones, for 
renting to small business.25 A key problem for analysis and policy is that small firms have 
generally been important net creators of jobs, but also suffered a high failure rate, so that 
increasing births by policy encouragement will also to lead to higher death rates.26   
 
The partial evidence we have for Dundee provides some support for the importance of small 
firms in generating manufacturing employment. Table 3 shows the net change in employment 
by size band for the 1980s. On the other hand, there is evidence (from a somewhat earlier 
period) that small firm (below 25 employees) birth rates were well below the Scottish average 
in Tayside (with an associated lower death rate), and, importantly, that this could not be 
accounted for by the industrial composition of local industry; there seem to have been 
specific locational factors present in the area.27 
 
But new firms do not of course have to be small. An important feature of Scottish and 
Dundee industrial history was the entry of multinationals as major job creators from the 
1940s, but, as discussed further below, major problems arose in the 1970s which involved not 
only the contraction and closure of existing MNEs, but the failure of new MNEs to come to 
Scotland.28  
 
     II 
 
The jute industry dominated Dundee from the middle of the nineteenth until well into the 
twentieth century, though the industry reached its peak employment before 1914, and shrank, 
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unevenly, thereafter before its final demise in 1998. The story of this decline may seem a 
straightforward one, of an industry squeezed and eventually eliminated by low wage 
competition. Up until 1939 such a narrative would be largely appropriate. Drawing on raw 
jute from Bengal, and selling its products all over the world, ‘Juteopolis’ was a striking 
example of the process of ‘imperial globalization’ which characterised much of the British 
economy in the decades before 1914.29 The industry was subject to increasingly serious 
competition from India’s jute manufacturers from the 1880s, but was hit especially hard in 
the 1930s, and by the end of that decade  the industry had shrunk to a fraction of its pre-1914 
size.  
Table 3. Employment in jute in Dundee, 1948-1999 (to nearest thousand). 
 
 Women Men Total 
1948 12,000 8,000 20,000 
1954 12,000 9,000 21,000 
1959 9,000 8,000 17,000 
1964 9,000 9,000 18,000 
1969 7,000 9,000 16,000 
1974 3,000 6,000 9,000 
1979 2,000 5,000 7,000 
1982 1,000 3,000 4,000 
1991 300 1,000 1,300 
1999 0 0 0 
 





Protection organised under the Jute Control from 1939 helped to stabilise the industry, with 
employment peaking in 1954, and thereafter falling only slowly until the late 1960s contrary 
to the expectations of much more rapid shrinking at the time of the Working Party Report on 
the industry in 1948, which emphasized the likely effects of Indian competition.30 
Protectionism, and the local ‘Gentleman’s Agreements’ which underpinned its operation, 
were the focus of great deal of attention at the time, and by subsequent analysts.31 But the 
broader forces shaping the industry’s destiny were the global decline in the traditional uses of 
jute as bags and sacking for transport, in the face of bulk carrying and containerization, and 
insofar as bags and sacks were still used, the increasing substitution of paper and later 
polypropylene for jute.32  
 
The protection afforded the industry, by increasing the price of jute products, may have 
hastened the rise of competitive products, but it does not seem to have inhibited significant 
investment in the industry, considerable technical progress, and the search for new uses for 
jute. Investment was substantial, and accompanied by increased firm level concentration in 
the industry. 33 A Research Association was set up, and this helped encourage technical 
changes which helped lead to a healthy productivity performance.34 There was also a major 
shift towards exploiting new uses for jute—first as a backing for linoleum (where demand 
multiplied up until 1955), then as carpet-backing. By the early 1970s about 80 per cent of 
total output was going to carpet-makers.35 These new uses made the industry much less 
affected by Indian competition in the old staple products. Whatever the effects of protection 
at an earlier stage, by the late 1970s it was not the crucial issue for the industry’s fortunes, 




The key technical change was the introduction of the synthetic fibre polypropylene, used not 
only for sacking but also for carpet-backing. The two biggest jute firms, Low and Bonar and 
Jute Industries Limited, had been quick to spot the potential of this new material and entered 
into a joint venture for its production. But the production of polypropylene involved quite 
different patterns than those characteristic of jute. First of all, it was a much less labour 
intensive product.  Second, there were few if any locational advantages in making 
polypropylene-based products in Dundee, whereas for jute Dundee was a classic ‘industrial 
district’, leading to high levels of efficiency and profitability.37 Thus, while polypropylene 
proved important to the corporate survival of one of the ‘big two’ jute firms, relatively little 
of the material was made or used in manufacturing in Dundee.38 
 
The story of jute is not a story of ‘decline’ as pathology. As Howe argues, the decline of 
Dundee jute derived primarily from technical change in transport (bulk carrying, 
containerization) and the invention of polypropylene. ‘To the question, could jute in the long 
term have competed more effectively against these new methods, the answer must be no’.39  
In the absence of any pathological narrative we have no need to search for those who can be 
‘blamed’ for the industry’s demise; in particular, the most common declinist tropes of 
blaming either under-investment by employers, inefficiency on the part of managers, or 
intransigence on the part of workers or trade unions for the shrinking of an industry, are 
wholly irrelevant.40 
 
Nor, after 1945, was the decline of jute mainly a problem of ‘globalization’, here using that 
word in the limited sense of low wage competition. The scope of such competition shrank as 
the product mix in Dundee diversified away from the traditional areas where Indian and 
Pakistani goods now dominated world markets. 41  This point should not be exaggerated: 
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South Asian producers were themselves seeking to diversify as global markets for bagging 
and sacking contracted, but the limits of international competition are shown by how slowly 
import penetration rose in Britain even as protection of the home market eroded after 1963 
(Table 4). As Howe summarizes the position: ‘most commentators would thus agree that 
Control moved from a position in the 1950s where it was indispensable to the survival of the 
Dundee industry to one in the later 1960s where technological change had made it 
irrelevant’.42 Thus the political focus on protectionism in Dundee was by this time to a large 
extent misplaced.43 
 
Table 4. Import penetration in the UK jute market, 1952-1976   
 Yarn Imports 
(‘000 tonnes) 
Yarn imports as 






as a percentage 
of home 
consumption 
1952 0.3 2.6 56.8 53.7 
1957 1.7 1.0 49.7 43.8 
1962 3.8 2.6 51.9 43.1 
1967 1.5 1.9 50.3 47.3 
1972 2.8 2.6 27.7 56.3 
1976 1.3 2.7 23.1 66.3 
 
 Source: Howe, Dundee Textile Industry, pp.60-61. 
 
Post-war employment in jute, returning to Table 4, did not decline sharply until the late 
1960s. This bears emphasis. The industry was still a major source of jobs with 18,000 in 1964 
and 16,000 in 1969. Closures in the 1950s had a limited negative impact on employment. 
Some were linked to the changing structure of the industry. Table 6 shows an incomplete 
listing of such jute plant-closures. Most followed acquisition by other companies, rather than 
the exit of a stand-alone entity.  The number of independent entities fell by 23 per cent from 
1945 to 1967, while the industry’s largest five firms increased their market share from 50 per 
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cent in 1958 to 73 per cent by 1975.44  While not a perfect measure of changing structure, the 
membership of the employers group, the Association of Jute Spinners and Manufacturers, 
declined from its post-war peak of 40 in 1958 to 14 by 1977.45 
 
The listing of closures in table 6 gives some sense of the pattern of contraction, but misleads 
if taken to suggest that closure was the main mechanism for job loss. More important were 
the falling numbers in plants that remained open. One example is Camperdown works, 
historically the largest of all jute factories in the city, with a workforce of over 14,000, but 
which by the time of its closure in 1981 employed only 340 workers.46 Sidlaw Industries, 
which owned the site, had reduced the number of its textile workers in the city from 3,280 in 
1977 to 650 in 1981, after the Camperdown closure.47 
 
The other component of the demographics of the industry were the absence of new entries 
into the industry. Only one new plant was built after the war, Taybank Mill in 1948—which 
was also the last to close, in 1998, making 80 workers redundant.48  
 
Table 5: Closures of jute companies within Dundee city boundaries, 1954-1998 
(incomplete). 
 
1954 Craigie Works, Robertson St. 
1957 Belmont Works, Hawkhill 
1958 Longtown Works Milton of Craigie 




1959 North British Linoleum Company, 
Clepington Rd. 
1960 Victoria Works, Ure St; Balgay works, 
Lower Pleasance; Maxwelltown Works, 
Alexander St. 
1964 Larchfield Works, Brook St. 
1966 Claverhouse Bleachfield 
1968 Cowgate Calender 
1969 Heathfield Works, Hawkhill,; Caledonian 
Works, Anderson’s Lane, Lochee 
1970 South Anchor; Dundee Linoleum 
Company, South Road; Walton Works, 
Brook St; King’s Cross Works, Loons 
Rd; Wellington Works, Hilltown 
1971 MidWynd Works, Hilltown; Dundee 
Linen Works, Constitution St;  
1973 Kingsmead Carpets; Kinnaird Works, 
Ogilvie’s Rd. 
1974 Caldrum East spinning mill; Eagle Mills 
Victoria St; Dudhope Works, Douglas St. 
1975 Angus Works, Fairbairn St. 
1976 Seafield Works, Taylor’s Lane; 
Bowbridge polypropylene weaving 




1977 Garden Works, Benvie Rd.; Caldrum 
West; Jamaica Works, Jamaica St.; East 
Port Works. 
1978 Upper Dens Works, Princes St.; Lower 
Dens Work, Princes St. 
  
1980 Dundee Bleachworks, Midmill; Dura 
Mill, Dura St.; Bower Factory, Douglas 
St.; Filtrona Textile Products, Gourdie 
Ind. Estate; Bowbridge polypropylene 
plant 
1981 Camperdown Works, Lochee; 
1996 Manhattan Works 
1998 Taybank Works 
 
Sources: Evening Telegraph 21 August 1981, 18 October 1994, 1 September 1998; Herald 5 
February 1996; Dundee University Archives MS/24/1/7/1/1 Low and Bonar Company 
Announcements, 1 September 1977.   
 
The post-1945 decline of jute evoked much heart-searching, but no significant resistance on 
the parts of workers. Apart from a wage dispute in 1961, industrial relations in the industry 
were largely characterised by co-operation and agreement.49  We can only speculate on why 




One important element was that, for the period down until the 1980s, there was compensating 
employment growth in the city. This was particularly associated with the location and 
expansion of multinational enterprise (MNE) manufacturing through UK regional assistance. 
The closure of Longtown Works in Milton of Craigie in 1958 illustrates this very point. 
Timex, the US-owned mechanical watch-maker, extended its engineering workshops yards 
just across the road from the Longtown Works in 1957, increasing production and 
employment at a cost to the Treasury of £25,000.50 We can draw a parallel here with the 
‘moral economy’ established in the coal-mining industry, where loss of jobs in that industry 
was initially, from the 1950s to the 1970s, compensated either by coal jobs elsewhere or other 
local industrial employment.51 In Dundee, of course, the context was different. We are 
analysing an industry in a very restricted geographical area, where there was a long-term 
recognition that the industry was in secular decline, and that alternative jobs needed to be 
found. We can see this recognition clearly at work as far back as the city council’s 1931 
publication, with the evocative title ‘Do It in Dundee’. 52 Even earlier it is evident in the 
City’s pressure to build a road bridge over the Tay, which dates back to just after the First 
World War, and was always linked to ideas about diversifying the local economy.53     
 
This concern was translated into effective action with the Distribution of Industry Act of 
1945, the basis of the regional policies that were used to attract industry to the city for the 
next three decades. These industries typically offered better pay and better conditions to 
Dundee workers than were available in jute, and many workers (especially women) voted 
with their feet and fled the low pay, noise and dirt of jute production.54  By 1951 the jute 
employers were pressing the Board of Trade to reduce the inducements to new industry as 
they suffered labour shortages; indeed, complaints of such shortages continued well into the 




So for many Dundonians, down to the 1970s, the decline of jute was compensated for, (and 
for many, more than compensated for), by the availability of better paid and more congenial 
work. Skilled men who left the industry to work in Timex in the late 1960s doubled their 
earnings. 56 While the loss of jobs in jute was not welcomed, and was no doubt painful for 
many of the individuals involved (especially older workers who found it more difficult to get 
jobs in other sectors), it was not regarded as a disaster. It is instructive to compare the sense 
of decline in the 1930s, when the loss of jobs in jute was catastrophic not only because of 
their scale, but also because there was so little growth of alternatives. It was only in the late 
1970s, and especially the 1980s, with the simultaneous contraction of jute and most other 
industrial sectors, that a sense of a major local unemployment returned. And, as discussed 
below, it was in that period that two of the main examples of worker resistance to job losses 
in specific companies took place. 
 
The context of the decline of jute was one in which there was a long-established narrative in 
the city that the industry was one which would always struggle against Indian competition.57  
This did not lead entirely to fatalism in the industry, as has been suggested in noting the 
search for new markets and products by the jute firms, but it helps to explain the degree of 
co-operation offered by the worker and union to the employers. The main union, the Dundee 
and District Union of Jute and Flax Workers, worked with the employers on such issues as 
recruitment and protection, having been converted in the 1930s on the second of these from 
its previous free trade stance.58  
 
Despite amalgamations in the industry, jute remained a locally-controlled sector, so that the 
hostility that could be mobilised against remote owners was not relevant. This contrasts with 
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the one case of a declining ‘old staple’ where job loss was resisted-in the shipbuilding firm of 
Caledon (see section IV below).59 The Caledon workforce was also entirely male, whereas 
the jute industry was traditionally very much a ‘women’s industry’. However, in the post-war 
years, as Table 3 shows, there had been a marked switch in this regard, so that by the late 
1960s the majority of the jute workforce were male. This shows the success of industrial 
diversification of Dundee, which is examined in further detail below, with the widening range 
of opportunities for women, alongside the increase in skill levels in jute production. In any 
event, it would be a great simplification to suggest only male-dominated workforces resisted 
employment shrinkage and closures. For example, it was an overwhelmingly female work 
force that resisted closure at Lee Jeans in 1981 (an event that happened to co-incide with the 
sit-in at the Caledon yard), as it was the women workers who resisted the closure of Plessey 
in Bathgate.60 
 
    III 
 
One of the key drivers of employment changes in post-war Dundee was the arrival of 
American manufacturing multinationals, part of a general pattern in Scotland. The firms were 
encouraged by regional subsidies, the promise of relatively low-wage labour accustomed to 
industrial employment, and, initially, by trade protection. 61 This development had started 
almost as soon as the war ended, with around 40,000 jobs created country-wide by 1950.62  
 
Table 6 shows the composition of Dundee manufacturing amongst the largest firms close to 
the peak of employment in the sector in the mid-1960s.63 At this time it is clear that the 
MNEs (Timex, NCR, Veeder-Root) were making a substantial but not overwhelming 
contribution to sustain employment in the city. Jute, to reiterate, remained an important force 
21 
 
in the city until the early 1970s. Total manufacturing employment (1965) was 44,820, with 
the three American MNEs providing 7,910 jobs, approximately 18 per cent.64 The firms listed 
in Table 7 employed 55 per cent of the manufacturing workforce—emphasizing their 
importance, but also the continuing role of small and medium-sized employers, (there were a 
small number of large companies with relatively small-scale activities in Dundee eg 
Ferrranti).65  
 
Table 6.  Largest manufacturing employers in Dundee in 1966 (all companies with over 
500 employees) 
 





Jute Industries Jute. Locally-owned. 2,553 1,513 4066 
NCR Electronics. American 
MNE 
3,235 813 4048 
Timex Watches. American 
MNE 
1008 2165 3173 
DCThomson Publishing and printing. 
Locally-owned. 
1,595 672 2267 
Keiller Jam and marmalade. 
Locally-owned. 
345 873 1218 
Morphy Richards  Domestic appliances: 
English based. 
869 204 1073 
Bonar Long  Electrical transformers. 
Locally-owned. 
883 181 1064 
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J. Scott Jute: locally-owned 534 530 1064 
Burndept Batteries. English-based. (661)* (372*) 1033 
Caledon Shipbuilding. Locally-
owned. 
929 34 963 
Unijute Jute: locally-owned 485 408 893 
Veeder-Root Computer mechanisms. 
American MNE. 
558 231 789 
Valentines Printing and publishing: 
locally-owned 
321 409 730 
Baxters Linen and jute. Locally-
owned. 
352 370 722 
Caird  Jute: locally-owned 361 352 713 





386 223 609 
Mallom Jute. Locally-owned 299 268 567 
Yorkshire 
Imperial Metals 
Brass Finishers. English 
based. 
302 205 507 
Totals  15,919 10,209 26,128 
 
Source: TNA: PRO BT177/2686 Miss McGhee (Office for Scotland) to Miss Hodkinson, 
‘Information for brief on Dundee’, 29 November 1966. ‘Manufacturing’ and ‘employees’ are 
not defined by the source. 
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(*No breakdown by gender is given in the original document for this company, so 
these numbers have been estimated as if Burndept’s composition reflected the average 




Amongst the MNEs in Dundee, one of the earliest arrivals was Timex, and its presence, 
through to its final departure in 1993, has come to be seen as emblematic of the problematic 
role of such enterprises in Scotland in general and Dundee in particular.66  
 
From the employment levels recorded in Table 6, Timex expanded rapidly in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, to reach a peak at over 6,000 workers in 1974, declining to complete closure by 
1993. The decline after 1974 eventually led to a major dispute in 1983, with an occupation 
focused on the predominantly male Milton plant. After six weeks the occupation ended with 
union agreement to 425 job losses, but there were no compulsory redundancies as there were 
sufficient applicants for voluntary departure.67 Over the next ten years employment dwindled 
until final closure. 
 
In the considerable debate about the role of US MNEs in the Scottish economy, one strong 
criticism often made was that they were branch plants.68 Branch plants have been seen as of 
limited benefit because of their perceived lack of linkages with the local economy, their 
provision of only low-skilled assembly work, but also as embodying only a fragile presence 
in the local economy because of the ease with which they can be closed down without 




Timex was a pioneering producer of the mass-produced mechanical watch, for which it built 
a large scale assembly plant in Dundee. Many of the jobs provided were low-skilled, and the 
company’s operations were based on a highly-gendered structure in which these jobs were 
overwhelmingly undertaken by women, who supervised almost entirely by men. But it also 
employed a significant number of men on tool-making and related activities, and these 
activities fed into the company’s global activities.70 Ex-skilled workers recall repairing 
machinery that was sent from the USA to Dundee for this purpose, and returned for use in the 
firm’s US factories.71 So even in its earlier days, the alleged shortcomings of branch plants 
only applied in part in the case of Timex. 
 
The decline and then departure of Timex was closely linked to the decline of the mechanical 
watch, and the company’s decision to focus instead on the assembly of components for 
consumer electronics. The rundown of the company was part of a global strategy of the 
company, but it should be noted that this was not a case of switching production of a low-
skill product to the Global South. The residual watch-making activity was moved to France, 
but most of the jobs previously done by women working for Timex in Dundee disappeared 
entirely as the market for mechanical watches collapsed. The later phase of departure also 
sent work previously done in Dundee to other parts of Europe.72 So the demise of Timex was 
not a simple ‘globalization’ story, if that term is taken to suggest the relocation of jobs to low 
wage areas. 
 
The other big American MNE in Dundee was NCR.  It began making cash registers and 
accounting machines in the city in 1946. After rapid growth in the late 1960s, employment 
peaked at 6,500 workers in the city at nine locations, in 1970. It grew rapidly on the basis if 
decimalization in Britain (1971), but was seemingly completely unprepared for the take-off 
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of electronics in the business machine sector.73 In response to this technological change, the 
company undertook radical re-organization of its whole business. Employment was cut across 
the board, including at the company HQ in Dayton, Ohio, where employment fell from 
14,500 to 870 between 1971 and 1977. In Europe production was concentrated in Dundee and 
Augsburg. From 1971 there was a continuous decline in numbers employed, although 
manufacturing only ceased in 2009 and the company retains a small non-manufacturing 
facility in the city.74 The evolutionary nature of employment changes at the firm was 
emphasized by Hood and Young, who saw it as exemplifying the slow ‘retreat’ of MNEs in 
Scotland. Corporate restructuring and concentration of production at alternative sites, 
typically elsewhere in Western Europe, meant that job losses accrued in significant numbers 
often years or even decades prior to eventual closure and departure. At NCR a sudden 
reversal of fortunes in 1971 evoked protest marches and brief stoppages late in that year, but 
no further forceful opposition. After significant redundancies in the early 1970s, the company 
revived later that decade as it completed the switch to a fully electronics-oriented facility. But 
in the crisis of the early 1980s, and following a five-week strike over wages, further 
redundancies brought employment to less than a thousand.75 
 
NCR in Dundee evolved away from branch assembly activity in its cash register production 
phase, and by the 1960s was less focussed on such activity than Timex. By the end of that 
decade it was an almost self-sufficient entity, meeting all of its need from raw materials 
through assembly to testing. The nature of its activities is suggested by the gender 
composition of its workforce (Table 6) whose maleness reflected the absence of an assembly 
operation on the scale of Timex. At that time little R and D was done in Dundee, but that 




Like Timex, the decline of NCR was the consequence of technological changes which led to 
major corporate re-structuring. These involved a transition to less labour-intensive activities, 
but also the shift of work out of Dundee. Such a shift was undoubtedly facilitated by the 
companies MNE status, though in neither case was there a wholesale shift of activity to a 
‘low-wage’ area outside Europe.  
 
A general survey of MNE activity in Tayside in the early 1990s suggested that MNEs 
brought capital and new technologies to the area, but supplied many of their inputs from 
imports, and suggested that, partly as result, no new local suppliers came into being to cater 
for the MNEs needs.77  But by then MNE employment had shrunk to a fraction of its previous 
size.78 As we have seen, MNEs in Dundee made a significant impact on employment in the 
city, providing many well-paid jobs to both men and women. This impact was not short-
lived, being strong from the 1940s to the 1970s. But ultimately it was transient, and in the 
1970s and 1980s their decline was significant part of the de-industrialization of the city. 
 
Forceful resistance to de-industrialization is an important part of the political history of post-
war Dundee. Resistance was especially pronounced at Timex in 1983 and 1993, but in each 
instance workers were opposing changes to production or the system of pay and reward rather 
than corporate flight. It is true that in 1983 the firm decided to end watch-making and close 
the Milton of Craigie plant, concentrating its new emphasis on contract electronics assembly 
production at another site in the city, at Camperdown. This was the scene of a major dispute 
in 1993, triggered when the firm sought to impose a programme of temporary lay-offs, a one-
year wage freeze and reduced fringe benefits.79 Closure followed seven months later, and 
only after the dispute had evolved painfully from a strike to a lockout, involving the dismissal 
– on dubious legal grounds – of the plant’s remaining 340 workers.80 These acts of resistance 
27 
 
were important, but partly because they were in fact  highly atypical of the response to job 
losses. To reiterate, most such losses were part of a gradual process of attrition, so closures 
typically came long after the plant had passed its maximum level of employment. This 
explains why the number of people engaged in resistance to closures is always so small: they 
are a ‘residual’ workforce making a ‘last stand’. This is true for Timex in 1993, as we have 
seen, but also, for example, outwith Dundee, for Plessey, which employed 2,400 workers in 
1973, but only 330 at the time of the 1982 occupation.81  Also typical of a wider feature of 
resistance to closure was that it was most evident where a remote (often foreign) owner could 
be identified as the decision-maker behind the closure, which gave clear agency to the 
decision and an ideological charge to that resistance. Finally, we must note that resistance to 
closure was bunched in the years of the early 1980s, both in Dundee and elsewhere in 
Scotland and the UK. In Dundee the battles at Caledon (returned to in the next section) and 
the first one at Timex were shadowed by the recession of the early 1980s, the most serious 
since the 1930s, and the trebling of registered unemployment.82 Unsurprisingly, the prospect 
of job loss within a labour market seeming to offer poor possibilities of alternative 
employment, created a stronger disposition to resist. To put the point another way: in the 
early 1980s an extraordinarily sharp contraction of industrial jobs was superimposed on a 
much longer trend. 
 
     IV 
 
The story of de-industrialization in Dundee is not just about jute and MNEs. Significant job 




Shipbuilding had been an important Dundee industry from the early nineteenth century, but 
pressure from larger yards elsewhere meant that by 1920 it had been concentrated into one 
company, Caledon’s. The company enjoyed a boom during the Second World War and into 
the 1950s, but the gross tonnage launched peaked in the late 1940s, and had halved by the 
early 1960s. By 1971 employment was down to just over 1,000. 83 Contraction continued, and 
in 1981 British Shipbuilders, who had acquired the yard on the nationalization of the industry 
in 1976, announced its closure. Closure was opposed by a sit-in of 140 workers, with the 
chair of the shop stewards asserting: ‘I am only interested in the yard. I had the opportunity to 
serve my time in this yard and I want other youngsters to get the opportunity to do the 
same.’84 
 
The occupation was unsuccessful and the yard closed, though many of the workers found 
jobs at the neighbouring Kestrel Marine that grew out of the boat-builders Smith and Hutton 
(closed 1975), and by 1983 was employing 1,000 workers in ship repair and oil rig 
fabrication.85 The willingness of the Caledon workers to resist closure was partly the result of 
a belief that British Shipbuilders were dishonest in their claims about the yard’s financial 
position and productivity performance, as well as the prevalence of restrictive practices, in 
the yard.86 So, ironically perhaps, nationalization in this case seems to have reinforced the 
sense of a remote, uncaring management.  
 
Employment in Britain’s docks has plummeted in the wake of containerization, especially 
evident from 1965 onwards.87 But in Dundee, as elsewhere, the contraction began much 
earlier. The National Dock Labour Board statistics do not give separate data for Dundee 
docks, but include them in ‘East Scotland’, where employment fell from 2,535 in 1947, 2,082 
in 1950, to 1,793 in 1960, 1,375 in 1965, 1,207 in 1970, and only 699 in 1975. This scale of 
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decline is indicative of what happened in Dundee, where the Census records 374 dockers in 
1951, 120 by 1971. 88   
 
The contraction of the UK railway network and accompanying decline of the labour force is 
often linked to the Beeching Report of the 1960s, but in fact it is noticeable from soon after 
railway nationalization in 1948. In the 1950s the rise of cheap road transport was exposing 
both freight and passenger services to sharp competition, and British Railways were 
responding with significant cuts, including in Dundee. 89 In the 1960s the process accelerated. 
In that decade across the UK railways came second only to coalmining for the scale of job 
losses, with 128,000 going between 1964 and 1969.90 In Dundee contraction was epitomised 
by the closure of Dundee East station in 1959, followed by Dundee West in 1965. Probably 
even more important in employment terms was the closure of Tay Bridge engine shed (linked 
to the transition from steam to diesel traction) in May 1967, where over 350 people had 
previously been employed.91 In the census of  1951 1063 people were recorded as ‘railway 
transport workers’ of all grades, while by 1971 the figure was 460. 92 
 
 
              V 
 
De-industrialization changes the labour market in two distinguishable ways. Insofar as it 
takes place through job losses (as opposed to the absence of fully compensating new 
industrial job creation), it brings the immediate threat of unemployment. If these job losses 
are concentrated in periods of macroeconomic contraction, then this problem will be much 
more serious. Irrespective of how it occurs, de-industrialization by definition brings a trend 
change in the types of jobs available. The central concern of those who see de-
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industrialization as key to change in the labour market, is that even if one sets aside the 
impact of unemployment, de-industrialization will bring about a polarization of the labour 
market. The service-dominated economy generates lots of ‘lovely’ jobs for the educated, but 
also lots of ‘lousy’ jobs for those with limited educational qualifications.93 We can christen 
these problems respectively the ‘transitional’ and the ‘steady state’ problems resulting from 
de-industrialization. 
 
Christening the first aspect ‘transitional’ is intended to make an important analytical 
distinction, but should not be taken to suggest that the problem is either minor or rapidly 
resolved. Those who are thrown on the labour market with perhaps high, but redundant, job-
specific skills but limited education, will generally find it very difficult to make the shift to 
the ‘lousy’, let alone the ‘lovely’ jobs in the service economy. So the impact of job losses 
may be prolonged, and not necessarily limited to the generation immediately affected by job 
loss, if that loss results in family deprivation with its potentail to pass disadvantage down 
through the generations. 
 
So in looking at what has happened in post-war Dundee we can usefully deploy this 
distinction, whilst recognising that in practice the nature and impact of change in the labour 
market cannot be easily categorised. 
 
Recorded unemployment in Dundee was below the Scottish average in the 1950s and 
1960s.94 While net emigration increased, the total population of the city rose between 1951 
and 1961 and was then stable until 1971. These employment and population trends suggest 
the city was participating substantially in the post-war ‘golden age’ of the British economy. 
In 1969 an article about the city in the Financial Times was headed ‘Dundee-from depression 
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to dynamism in 25 years’.95 As already noted, the labour market underpinnings of this 
prosperity came from the slowing of jute’s decline by protection and innovation in the 
industry, coupled to the growth of new manufacturing industries, including the influx of 
multinationals. But in the 1970s unemployment rose significantly, then shot up again from 
1979. 96 By September 1979 the official rate had reached 9 per cent before peaking at 18 per 
cent in 1991.97 But increasingly this official figure underestimated the real rate of joblessness. 
More comprehensive calculations give estimates of 20.6 per cent for January 1997. This 
calculation also suggests that a significant proportion of this ‘hidden unemployment’ was 
female, with a women’s unemployment rate of 15.5 per cent. This may perhaps be a hidden 
legacy of the high employment rates of women in the city, dating back to jute and the post-
war American multinationals, with a residue of older women who lost jobs and never 
regained employment. 98 
 
The early 1990s do seem to represent a nadir in Dundee’s post-1945 economic fortunes. The 
Carstairs Index of poverty shows Dundee City to have had some of the most deprived 
postcodes in Scotland in 1991. A few years later, an analysis of social security claimants 
found 35 per cent of households in Dundee were in receipt of social security benefits, 
compared with a national average of 33%, and with Glasgow at 52 per cent, using the unitary 
authorities as the unit of analysis. 99 
 
For the purposes of the argument here we can think of ‘a new ‘steady state’ emerging as the 
pace of de-industrialization slowed at the end of the 1990s. ‘Steady state’ exaggerates, as 
employment in industry continued to decline in the early twenty-first century. But as a trend a 
falling share of employment in industry must eventually come to an end, when it reaches 
zero. In practice the trend will end well before that level is reached, as it is impossible to 
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conceive of a structure of costs that makes it worthwhile to import every single industrial 
output. In other words, there is a minimum below which industrial employment cannot 
plausibly fall, and it is possible that the contemporary UK and Scotland are getting close to 
that minimum, though this is an inherently speculative proposition.   
 
Table 1 shows the general shift from industrial to non-industrial employment over the whole 
period 1951-2001. ‘Services’ are an extremely heterogenous category, and the expansion of 
such employment has been accompanied by enormous changes in its composition. This 
expansion has been accompanied by major changes in official definitions, so Table 7 only 
gives a rough guide to those shifts. 
Table 7.  Changing composition of services in Dundee, 1951-2001 (proportion of 
employed population) 
Sector (1951/2001 definitions)      
1951     
2001     
Distributive trades/wholesale and retail trade and repairs 14.0 16.4 
Insurance banking and finance/financial intermediaries 1.6 2.7 
Other professional and business services/real estate, renting and business 
activities 
0.4 9.6 
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT   
Public administration and defence/public administration, defence and 
social security 
4.0 5.7 
Medical and dental services/health and social work 3.6 15.3 
Education 2.8 8.8 
 





Employed with caution, table 7 is useful in identifying some of the major changes in the 
service sector employment.100 The most striking changes are the rise of ‘real estate, renting 
and business activities’, linked, amongst other factors, to the spread of private home 
ownership and the splitting-off of many business services (accounting, marketing, etc) from 
previous ‘in-firm’ provision. The second feature to be emphasized is the rise of health and 
education to key employment sectors, sectors overwhelmingly in the public sector.  
 
As Table 7 makes clear, Dundee, like many post-industrial parts of Britain, became highly 
dependent on public sector employment in the last decades of the twentieth century, reliant 
on a kind of ‘regional Keynesianism’ not sufficiently stressed in most accounts of 
contemporary Britain. 101 This growth of public employment can in turn be seen as a key 
component of the ‘de-globalization’ of the city, making its economic fortunes much more 
reliant on political decisions in London and Edinburgh, and much less (at least directly) on 
the vagaries of the international economy. 102 
 
The expansion of the public sector favoured the employment of women, who were much 
more strongly represented in that sector than in ‘new’ industries such as digital media of life 
sciences. Thus it has allowed Dundee to continue to be a relatively good place for female 
employment opportunities, following the demise of jute and the multinational electronics 
firms which previously provided a large number of such jobs.  Public sector employment is 
also now relatively well-paid compared with the private sector, though as much of this 
reflects the contracting out to the private sector of low-paid jobs previously done ‘in-house’ 




Evidence of the longer-term impact of de-industrialization, is given in Table 8. Along with 
overall population decline went a shift in the age structure, partly a result of out-migration of 





Table 8.   Working Population Changes in Dundee 1971-2001, per cent (post-1996 
boundaries 
 
 Percentage change in 
Dundee 
Percentage change in 
Scotland  
Total population -21.31 -3.07 
Population of working age -17.91 1.93 
Persons in employment -27.84 1.75 




Source: census data, collated by Turok, ‘Urban Policy’, 22.    
 
Evidence of the growing ‘precarity’ of employment is suggested by the levels of self-
employment and part-time work. On the first of these, national studies show that it is in part 
the consequence of the absence of employment opportunities, rather than indicative of a surge 
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in entrepreneurialism.103 Part-time work, much more prevalent amongst women, is sometimes 
the worker’s preference, but also a sign of the ‘lousy job’.  
 
Table 9: Economic activity in Dundee, 2001 (share of population aged 16-74)* 
 
Economic status Activity Men Women  
Economically active Part-time employee 3.6 16.8 
 Full-time employee 44.4 28.1 
 Self-employed 6.8 1.9 
 Unemployed 7.4 3.2 
 Fulltime Student 4.2 5.2 
Economically inactive Retired 12.2 17.9 
 Student 8.4 7.3 
 Looking after home/family 1.0 7.8 
 Permanently sick/disabled 8.5 7.4 
 Other 3.6 4.4 
 
*total population in this age group: male 54,959, female, 59,689 
 
Source: Census 2001. Scotland. Key Statistics for Settlements and Localities in Scotland, Tables 







As noted earlier, changes in sectoral composition were by no means the whole story of 
changes in the labour market in Dundee. Changes in occupation also need to be addressed, 
though here the changing categorisations mean that there are no directly comparable 
statistics. Taking Tables 10 and 11 together brings out the key point about the decline of 
manual occupations and the growth of a wide diversity of white-collar work, usually 
requiring formal educational qualifications at varying levels. The link between manual 
occupations and the absence of formal educational qualifications is brought out by the 
contrast between the 1951 Census, which found that 90 per cent of men and of 91 per cent of 
women had left school at the earliest opportunity (14/15 or earlier)—usually with no formal 
qualifications (though such qualifications may have been acquired at a later stage in the life 
cycle). By contrast, in 2001 34 per cent of the population had no educational qualifications, 
24.5 had group 1 (SVQ1-2), 16.6 group 2 (SVQ 3), 7.3 group 3 (SVQ4-5) and 18 group 4 
(degree or professional qualification). 104  
 




 Men (occupied or retired over 
15) percentage 
 Women (occupied or retired over 
15) percentage 
I 2.9 0.5 
II 10.8 11.0 
III 53.1 57.1 
IV 16.4 20.7 




*Social classes I and II are salaried workers, III, IV and V are wage workers, broadly divided 
into skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled respectively. 
 








Table 11.   Occupations in Dundee 2001 
 
Occupational Group Percentage of those aged 16-74 in 
employment 
Managers and senior officials 9.7 
Professional occupations 10.5 
Associate professional and technical 14.4 
Administrative and secretarial 12.3 
Skilled trades 10.7 
Personal service 7.0 
Sales and customer service 10.4 
Process, plant and machine operatives 10.5 










In sum, what we are tabulating here is the radical shrinking of the manual working class in 
the city. In the place of all those manual jobs there have proliferated a variety of mainly non-
manual service sector jobs, a large proportion of which require significant levels of 
educational qualification-the ‘lovely jobs’. But at the same time there has been the loss of 
opportunities for the substantial minority with little or nothing in the way of such 
qualifications-they are the people who have to do the ‘lousy jobs’. To reiterate, these changes 
in occupational structure are by no means all the result of sectoral shifts. Within industry, 
including manufacturing, more jobs were becoming technical and/or supervisory, usually 
requiring formal qualifications for those who took them up.105   
 
     V 
 
What are the implications of the Dundee case for our broader understanding of de-
industrialization? First, most generally, that this term’s use is always and inevitably 
embedded in broader narratives about economic development: it is not a ‘free-standing’ 
concept. Most discussion of de-industrialization still shows evidence of its origins in the 
1970s, and especially 1980s, when declinist assumptions about the American, British and 
Scottish economies were ubiquitous. This has meant that every industrial closure in those 
countries has tended to be interpreted within a story of national pathology, rather than as part 
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of the normal flux of economic activity in a capitalist economy, or as part of a trend common 
to all such economies. 
 
Second, because of this chronological origin, it has been common in both the British and 
Scottish cases to exaggerate the significance of the Thatcher period in the process of de-
industrialization, which began well before 1979, and continued long after. That this fore-
shortened chronology doesn’t fit the shrinking of the coal industry has been emphasized by 
recent research, but the point has much wider scope (see Table 1). 106 This is not to dispute 
the pain caused by the incompetence of Thatcher’s economic policies, but to suggest that 
excessive focus on the period tends to both misunderstandings of the causes of de-
industrialization, and unhelpful approaches to its politics. 
 
On causes, focusing too much on the experience of the 1980s will tend to conflate the short-
term effects of the sharp contraction at the beginning of that decade, and the continuation of 
long-term trends which had been proceeding since the 1950s.107 If we focus on trends we can 
see that, as the decline in industrial employment was evident across all the Western industrial 
countries, the causes must also be sought substantially in forces operative at an international 
and not just a British or Scottish level.108 Changes in consumption patterns, differing relative 
sectoral productivity performance and changing patterns of international trade and capital 
movement are then seen as broader contexts within which the British and Scottish cases 
worked out. 
 
On the politics, the policies of the Thatcher period are best seen as very important not for 
initiating de-industrialization (though they greatly accelerated the process), but, crucially, as 
changing how that process was responded to: as undermining the previous, if frayed, moral 
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economy. 109 These market fundamentalist policies broke with the moral economy of the 
previous decades, when to varying degrees it was deemed the duty of the state to offset, 
mitigate or compensate for the unavoidable disruptions that de-industrialization brings. 110 
 
Another problematic legacy of the origins of the de-industrialization debate in the 1980s is 
the question of links between globalization and de-industrialization. Of course globalization 
is multi-faceted, and if we associate with the influx of multinationals into Dundee after 1945 
it clearly brought substantial benefits of new technologies and enhanced wages and 
conditions for many workers.  But in the 1980s globalization was a term commonly linked 
de-industrialization by notions of capital flight. Much of the North American literature 
focussed on both ‘flight’ within countries (‘from the Rust Belt to the Sunbelt’) and between-
international or ‘global’ movements. The literature on Scotland and Britain focused more on 
the latter, as within country flight of capital was a less significant feature; while varying in 
degree, all parts of these countries were experiencing de-industrialization. Within the UK, 
industrial decline in London was enormous, as emphasized by the Greater London Council in 
the 1980s. 111 Within Scotland it was also happening everywhere. The traditional emphasis 
has been on West Central Scotland, and this article has obviously emphasized its serious 
impact in Dundee. But it also took place in the Highlands and in the Borders. 112 Perhaps 
most surprisingly, it was a powerful trend in Edinburgh, a city historically with a large 
industrial sector, but where more manufacturing jobs were lost in 1968-1976 than in Dundee 
(both absolutely and proportionately).113 
 
The Dundee case should caution us in putting too much attention on capital flight as a cause 
of de-industrialization. It we first take the case of jute, its problems never arose from this 
cause; as shown above its shrinking arose first from goods market competition, and the later 
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from technical change. Never was there a process of closing down jute mills and relocating 
their production elsewhere.114 
 
Jute was broadly typical of the whole textile industry, certainly including cotton, the largest 
component of that sector. Its decline had begun around the First World War, it was driven 
initially by low-wage competition from the ‘Third World’, with problems exacerbated by 
technical change after 1945, especially the invention of synthetic fibres. Despite significant 
technological innovation and product diversification, employment loss was large and 
persistent across the post-war years. 
 
Textiles were hugely important, especially for employment, and the employment of women, 
but they were not typical of the ‘old staples’ in key respects. The decline of coal was 
overwhelmingly driven by technical change coupled, in later years, with public policy on 
electricity generation, not by market competition; imports of coal were trivial until the 1990s, 
and even then only displaced a small proportion of the jobs that had been lost in the 
industry.115 Shipbuilding was, of course, hit by market competition, but in its most rapid 
period of decline in the late 1950s and 1960s this competition did not come from the ‘Third 
world’, but from other advanced industrial countries, Norway, Sweden and Japan.116 It is a 
similar story in iron and steel, where technical change and competition from other advanced 
countries were the main drivers of employment decline (only in the twenty-first century was 
competition from China and India significant).117 
 
What capital flight did occur in Dundee should caution us against a too simplistic view that 
this flight could be characterised as consisting of footloose, unembedded plants which fled to 
low-wage locations in the Global South.  As noted above, in the Dundee case, both of the 
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biggest multinationals eventually established activities which went well beyond branch plant 
assembly, with significant skilled employment, including in Research and Development. 
They did eventually cease manufacturing in the city (though they were hardly ‘transients’-
both provided industrial employment for almost fifty years), but insofar as the jobs lost went 
elsewhere, it was to other European locations, rather than developing countries. There was 
also relatively little of the direct transfer of employment as with the ‘rust-belt to sunbelt’ 
phenomenon within Britain. In Dundee, the only identified cases are Morphy Richards and 
Burndept (listed in Table 6) where, as part of corporate re-organizations, production was 
shifted south of the border in the 1970s.118 
 
We can use the Dundee case to helpfully complicate the stories of both the ‘old staples’ and 
the ‘new industries’ in their contribution to de-industrialization. But this ‘old/new’ dichotomy 
itself has serious limits. As the jute example brings home, the old staples were not 
characterised by an unchanging commitment to inherently outdated activities. In their helpful 
typology of industries suffering employment decline, Massey and Meegan suggested a three 
part characterization: ‘rationalization’, which is simple reduction in total capacity; 
‘intensification’, where labour productivity is driven up without major investment or re-
organization; and ‘investment and technical change’, which is self-explanatory.119 They 
rightly put jute in the third of these boxes, given, as noted above, that it was subject to major 
re-organization and reform, and, most strikingly, by the 1970s barely deserved the 
designation ‘jute industry’, so far had it shifted to the use of polyproplylene. It had become a 
‘new industry’. 
 
So the ‘old/new’ distinction needs to be treated with some care. Many important industries 
never fitted into that dichotomy. Food, Drink and Tobacco, for example, is not normally seen 
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as either of these, yet was and remained a major employer in the city. Publishing and printing 
is similar, with the particularly prominent example of DC Thomson. Probably the city’s most 
long-standing, stable source of private sector jobs, Thomson’s is a company which has 
thrived on producing a resolutely old-fashioned set of newspapers and magazines, but spread 
its investments widely, including into a range of new media.  
 
Finally, we return to the long arc of history within which we can place de-industrialization. If 
we see that process as akin to the historical transition from agricultural to industrial 
predominance, we can note that the historiography of that earlier transition has often run 
aground because disputants about its impact talked past each other.120 Those who emphasized 
its negative effects on popular welfare focused on the undoubted pains of the transition, and 
the long lag before the mass of the population saw much benefit in their material living 
standards. The ‘optimists’ focused attention on the long-run effects, when most of the 
transition had taken place, and so might be thought of as talking about something 
approaching a ‘steady state’ industrial society. In the context of de-industrialization, the point 
is not whether we take an overall ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ view, but that we recognise the 
utility of distinguishing the issues raised by an inherently painful transition as distinct from 
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